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ABSTRACT 
Growing commercial activities in the High North increase the possibility of unwanted incidents. 
The vulnerability related to human safety, environment, and installations or vessels, and a 
challenging context, call for strengthening of the preparedness system, and cross-boundary and 
cross-institutional collaboration.  
The commercial activity in the High North includes intra- and inter-regional transportation, the 
search for and exploitation of hydrocarbons and other mineral resources, the fisheries, and 
cruise tourism. In addition, in the High North we find government activity such as research and 
naval operations. Activities in the Arctic are challenged by limited infrastructure, low 
temperatures with ice and icing, polar lows, and a fragile nature. In this paper we look into 
different stressors and risk factors in the High North related to life and environment. A 
discussion of risk is important for decisions about operational demands and the development of 
an adequate preparedness system. 
High North is here defined as the circumpolar Arctic, delineated by the Arctic Circle. 
In the paper and presentation we will focus on the Atlantic Sector of the Arctic.  
The main operational risk factors faced include geographical remoteness, climate-change 
related aspects and weather, electronic communications challenges, sea ice, lack of precise 
maps or hydrographic and meteorological data. Activity and probability of accidents differs in 
different parts of the Arctic. An overview of maritime activity and risk assessment are given in 
the paper. Implications for the preparedness systems are discussed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Increasing human activity in the Arctic creates great concern about accidents and consequences 
for life and nature. There is a need for increased understanding of the risk factors, risk mitigating 
tools, and adequate preparedness system capacities. In this paper we analyze the expected 
activity level and risk patterns in the Norwegian and and West-Russian Arctic, i.e. the Barents 
Sea to Novaya Zemlya and the official boundary of the Northern Sea Route. 
The High North is the place of stable and growing political and economic interest from several 
countries, including Russia and Norway. Both countries have special Arctic strategies 
proclaimed as important issues (Norwegian Government, 2006, Norwegian Government, 2014, 
Russian Federation, 2009, Russian Federation, 2013). Nevertheless, there is no strict definition 
of “High North”. In the common sense, the High North is similar to the Arctic and includes 
territories to the north of Polar Circle (66o34’) (Skagestad, 2010). 
In our study we take into consideration the conical shape sea area to the north of 66o34’ up to 
the North Pole and between meridians 00o00’ and 58o00’ and Novaya Zemlya Coast on the 
east (see the map at Figure 1). We divide this area into 3 regions. These are distinguished in the 
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natural and social senses, have different levels and types of maritime activity and should be 
considered as providing quite different challenges for the emergency preparedness system 
(Table 1). 
 
Figure 1. Three regions under consideration. 
Base map is “Norwegian rescue service's 
area of responsibility” (red lines) 
(BarentsWatch, 2013) 
 
Table 1. Main features of the regions under consideration 
Region  1) Svalbard area 2) Mainland Norway (up to 
Bear Island on the north) 
3) Russian part of the Barents 
Sea 
Boundary W-E 00o00’ and 35 o00’East 00o00’ and 35 o00’East 35 o00’ and 58 o00’ 
Boundary N-S  74 o00’- 90 o00’ 66 o34’ and 74 o00’ Coastal line - 90 o00’ 
Natural features Long polar day and night. 
Harsh weather condition: 
low temperature, wind. 
Sea ice in the North 
Short period with polar 
night/day. 
Strong influence of North-
Atlantic current 
Polar low 
Polar night/day. Polar low. 
Fading North-Atlantic current 
and influence of Arctic. Sea ice 
influx from Kara Sea and the 
Arctic Ocean 
Economic 
features 
Population ca. 2800 
Very small economic 
activity 
Population: ca 500 000 
Rather equal activities along 
the region. 
Oil and gas exploration 
Population: ca. 700 000 
All activities concentrate in the 
south part. Oil/gas exploration  
Political features Norwegian jurisdiction 
Unmilitary zone 
Russian fishing and coal 
mining activities. 
Norwegian jurisdiction Russian jurisdiction 
Characteristics 
navigational 
difficulties 
Sea ice on the North 
Reduced satellite 
coverage. Lack of maps.  
Storms, Icing, “Heavy 
traffic” on most common 
ship routes and ports 
Storms, Icing 
Sea ice in South-East and North 
Maritime 
activity 
Fishery, Tourism,  
Cargo, Science, Tankers 
Cargo, Tankers, Fishery, 
Tourism, Science 
Cargo, Tankers, Fishery,  
Science ,Tourism, 
Shipping 
seasonal 
variation  
Large seasonal variation 
with peak in summer 
Quite stable during the year Seasonal increase due to 
Northern Sea Route activity in 
summer 
SAR features Svalbard Governor with 
help of Red Cross. 
Extremely low human 
resources 
North Norway JRCC in Bodø 
Good equipped with both  
tools and human resources  
Russian Rescue centers in 
Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and 
Naryan-Mar Performing rescue 
operations in heavy ice 
conditions is possible 
 
DOMINATING RISK FACTORS / STRESSORS 
Historically, the industrial exploitation of the High North has developed faster than the 
development of necessary infrastructure. One challenge is the preparedness systems for both 
search and rescue and oil spill recovery. It is important to have a profound knowledge about the 
 
 
dominating risk factors or stressors. Below we illuminate the difference in the regions as to risk 
factors. 
 
1) Svalbard area  
High Arctic conditions that may impact the probability of incidents are poorly charted waters 
and remoteness, in addition to ice, cold and unpredictable weather, and darkness in winter. In 
addition, underdeveloped infrastructure in the High North for maritime shipping creates extra 
challenges, for example limited and unstable radio/satellite communication. This may increase 
the risk of accidents, and may also represent a barrier for the preparedness system that is to 
mitigate the consequences of an incident. 
Seasonal changes in the High Arctic are more dramatic than anywhere else in the world:  
freezing and melting sea ice, and going from winter darkness to the midnight sun in a very short 
time. These influence the likelihood and costs of economic activity as well as the consequences 
of accidents.  
Climate changes are more visible in the Arctic. The average temperature here is increasing twice 
as fast as elsewhere in the world, and the polar ice cap is retracting. At the same time, there are 
local variations in ice conditions from year to year, making predictions difficult. 
The important stressors for the preparedness system are person accidents and missing people 
due to sinking ships. Fire and wrecking are just as possible as in other places. However, the 
limited capacities for mitigating the consequences of accidents means the consequences may be 
more severe. Better access to information has increased the public’s interest in industrial 
activity. Even though industries such as fishing, hunting, and mining have been there for 
centuries, the Arctic is perceived as the last untouched wilderness on earth. During recent years, 
Svalbard has been well known to the public as a popular tourist attraction. In the case of possible 
industrial development, the business players and authorities are likely to face more public 
scrutiny than those in the past and in other places.  
 
2) Mainland Norway 
The resources along the coast of mainland Norway create many business opportunities, and at 
the same time can have an impact on the likelihood of accidents. Along the coast there are large 
resources related to the fisheries, fish farming, oil and gas resources, and attractive regions for 
tourists and the local population. This generates large intra-regional traffic. In addition, there is 
quite a large inter-regional transport activity.  
There are more stress factors, such as growing global demand, shifting market conditions, 
increased physical access, environmental conflicts, and changing geopolitics (Stepien et al., 
2014). They can be referred to as political risk factors, which may influence the situation along 
the coast even in the stable region of Norway. 
Coastal Norway is, especially in the winter, facing some of the same challenges as the Svalbard 
region. Stormy weather, polar lows, and snow may severely challenge the safety of the traffic 
along the coast, and hamper the operations of the preparedness system. 
 
3) Russian part of the Barents Sea  
All the above mentioned risk factors are relevant for the Russian Atlantic sector from the 
Barents Sea to the Kara Sea. There is increased traffic through the Northern Sea Route, and 
emerging cruise ship traffic in the Russian part of the Barents Sea. There is also increased 
Russian activity in offshore oil and gas exploration as the industry moves offshore towards the 
shelf. Thus arises the concern for search and rescue capacities, and for security issues. Going 
east, the distances to adequate infrastructure increases. Ensuring the safety of maritime activities 
is difficult due to the considerable distances to harbors, airports and hospitals, as well as difficult 
ice conditions. The ice challenges in this region are quite high, and the icebreaker fleet becomes 
 
 
important for safety here. Russian icebreakers assist cargo and passenger vessels and military 
ships when crossing the ice on the Northern Sea Route, and provide safe Arctic tourism. Limited 
infrastructure in this region makes it difficult to face accidents with the necessary resources, 
also included within the preparedness system. 
   
ACTIVITY AND PROBABILITY OF INCIDENTS 
The activity of vessels and installations varies between sea areas and over the year. The pattern 
of ship traffic is presented in Figures 2-3 for the High North territory and for different types of 
ships. 
  
Figures 2 and 3. Ship traffic in 2012 for 2A) cargo (refrigerator – green; general – blue), tankers 
(red) and supply vessels (orange); 2B) fishing (yellow), passenger (bright blue) ship and the 
others (white). 
 
1) Svalbard area  
There are 4 main groups of vessels in the Svalbard area. These are tourist, cargo, research and 
fishing vessels. Naturally, the cruise ships dominate as to number of people, but the fishing 
vessels largely dominate by numbers. Due to ice and weather conditions, the ship traffic has 
large seasonal variation. The Norwegian Coastal Administrations data system shows that the 
number of fishing vessels changes from 10-20 in January-May, to 30-40 vessels in June-August, 
and 50-60 vessels in September-December.  
The tourist season starts in May with about 2 ships. In July-August there are 15 to 30 ships, in 
September around 10, and 2-4 ships at the end of the season until October.  
There are 2 cargo ships on fixed routes and 5-6 other dry bulk vessels that have random calls, 
with about 15-20 trips a year combined. There is also a reefer (freezer) ship, receiving fish from 
2-4 Russian trawlers almost all year.  
A few research vessels operate year round on Svalbard. An additional 5-8 vessels come during 
the period July to September. There are about 25-35 calls by ships carrying coal from Svea from 
July to December. During autumn months Barentsburg and Longyearbyen are visited by 2 to 3 
bulk carriers. There are also tankers supplying fishing vessels, cruise ships and the villages. The 
number is about 10 tanker vessel visits throughout the year. 
The studies by DNV GL, presented in 2 reports (DNV GL, 2014c, DNV GL, 2014a), show that 
there have been 48 ship accidents during the past 15 years in Svalbard. Most of them did not 
 
 
result in significant release of pollutants or damage. A ship accident involving the release of 
fuel or cargo is likely to occur in Svalbard every six years on average, according to two studies 
by a foundation analyzing future traffic patterns. Fishing vessels are likely to be responsible for 
most such incidents since they account for two-thirds of marine traffic, but accidents involving 
large cruise ships are likely to have the greatest impact due to their size.  
 
2) Mainland Norway  
The coastal sea traffic includes passenger and cargo transport along the coast of mainland 
Norway, and from neighboring countries, with use of smaller and medium-sized vessels. The 
coastal steamer, with up to 1,100 people on board, represents one of the largest and most 
frequent actors of passenger transport. The volume of internal transport in coastal regions is 
relatively stable. Traffic statistics for routes with compulsory pilotage between Norway and 
abroad and between Norwegian ports presented by the Norwegian Coastal Administration, 
counts for 16942 routes in the Northern Norway for 2013. In addition to those routes, there are 
many smaller routes that are not obliged for compulsory pilotage (9688 routes in 2013) and 
vessels exempted from the obligation (293 routes in 2013) (www.kystverket.no).  
A significant increase in traffic is in the shipping of goods between supply bases and 
installations on land and floating offshore platforms, initially from Sandnessjøen and 
Hammerfest, first from the Goliat field, and in the future from the planned Johan Castberg field 
in the Barents Sea. Many involved cargo routes belong to the special category of risk vessels. 
The Norwegian Coastal Administrations data system reports about 132 risk vessels per month 
on average for the region (www.kystverket.no). 
Intercontinental transport is primarily related to the Northern Sea Route (Northeast Passage) 
between Europe and Asia. The activity of the fishing fleet takes place close to shore and in open 
waters almost all year long. Further from mainland Norway there is all-year activity maintained 
by a number of large sea-going vessels, including factory vessels with a large crew. According 
to the Fishing Ministry database, there are 3426 fishing vessels registered in Northern Norway 
(www.fiskeridir.no).  
Petroleum activity is primarily related to exploration, development and production in coastal 
areas of the Norwegian Sea and the southern Barents Sea. The activity of exploration is rapidly 
increasing in these areas and moving further north and further east and west. The 23rd 
Norwegian oil and gas license round opens large areas in the Barents Sea for exploration. 
There is also growing research and observation activity in the High North, which includes 
various research vessels of many jurisdictions. Maritime tourism is linked to small and large 
passenger vessels. There is a strong increase in both the number of ships and passengers along 
the coast of Norway. This includes large ships with several thousand persons onboard. There is 
also a growing amount of leisure vessels. Among these are many unexperienced sailors and 
they more often face challenges with the need for help from the preparedness system. 
Norwegian Maritime Authority controls incidents statistics. Table 2 demonstrates 558 accidents 
registered in their database for the region between mainland Norway and Svalbard.  
 
Table 2.  Percentage of traffic and accidents  
 Svalbard area Coastal Norway Other areas in Northern Norway 
Traffic percent 2.71 % 85.32 % 11.97 % 
Total accidents 7 529 22 
Incidents percentage 1.26 % 94.80 % 3.94 % 
Most of the accidents happen along the Norwegian coast. The register includes different types 
of reported accidents: occupational accidents; grounding; contact damage, piers, etc.; 
fire/explosion; collision; environmental damage; leaking; capsizing; missing vessels and 
 
 
weather damage. About half of the reported accidents are occupational accidents 
(www.sjofartsdir.no). 
 
3) Russian part of Barents Sea 
The categories of ships are mostly the same as used in sectors 1 and 2. However, a larger number 
of vessels are ice strengthened or icebreakers. The activities concentrated in the South-western 
part of Arctic Russia are similar to mainland Norway. Arctic cruises are few, however, but 
increasing into the harbors of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Ferries and combined transport-
passenger vessels deliver supplies to the populations in the coastal settlements of deliver 
personnel on the drilling platform Prirazlomnaya and other Arctic sites. 
The statistics for transportation in this region show that the freight turnover of Russian Arctic 
ports decreased in 2014 by 24.2% compared to the year 2013 and amounted to 35 million tons 
(Association of sea commercial ports of Russia, 2015). The decrease in transshipment of liquid 
bulk cargo ports of the basin amounted to 54.7% to 9.8 million tons (Murmansk - 87.7%, 
Arkhangelsk - 12.5%) to 2.4 million tons. Transshipment of dry cargo ports increased on 2.5% 
and amounted to 25.2 million tons (Murmansk - 0.4 %, Arkhangelsk - 5.6%). But in general, 
there was a decrease in transshipment: in Murmansk - by 30.4% to 21.9 million tons, 
Arkhangelsk - 5.4% to 4.2 million tons. The growth in cargo handling in the port of Varandey 
was 9.3% to 5.9 million tons.  
The decrease in foreign trade is most likely temporary, established under the influence of the 
global recession, as well as economic and technical sanctions introduced by western countries 
in 2014. The Russian oil and gas companies Gazprom and Rosneft implemented the project for 
exploration drilling in the Pechora sea shelf and Novaya Zemlya  that significantly impacted on 
marine activities (Association of sea commercial ports of Russia, 2015). It is uncertain whether 
this activity will continue in the next year.  
Over the last 10 years, the transport of cabotage cargoes increased from 23% to 31%. There 
was a reorientation of a considerable part of the cargo from large-tonnage vessels of unlimited 
sailing to smaller ships of river-sea navigation and coastal vessels. These changes are alarming, 
because the majority of accidents and the largest accidents (i.e. self-propelled pontoon 
“Varnek”, M/V “Victor Koryakin,” M/V “Sergey Kuznetsov” and the boat “Barents 1100") 
have occurred with such type of ships. 
Navigation via the Northern Sea Route, which is officially located to the east of Novaya 
Zemlya, is very important for the region. There was rapid increase of usage of this route in the 
previous four years. In 2013, 71 ships carried 1,355,897 tons of cargo through the Northern Sea 
Route (NSR information office, 2015), but a dramatic downturn occurred in 2014. The amount 
of cargo transported in transit dropped 77 percent compared to 2013. In the petroleum sector, 
there has been a growing amount of offshore exploration activity. As an example, an expedition 
in the Kara Sea included 10-15 vessels with several hundred crew. The logistics in this area is 
complicated, hampered by the lack of harbors and other infrastructure. 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT ACCIDENTS 
The severity of accidents greatly depends on place and time and the preparedness to response, 
rescue and eliminate the negative impact. This may vary between the regions: 
 
1) Svalbard area  
Oil spills and life-threatening accidents with large cruise ships are the most discussed events 
due to the consequences and the limited preparedness capacity for search and rescue, hospital 
care and oil spill response. Fortunately, there have not been any large marine oil spills in the 
Svalbard area and totally in the Arctic, so there is not much local experience to learn from. The 
most relevant previous oil spill for making comparisons is the Exxon Valdez disaster (Alaska, 
 
 
March 1989. 42,000 m3 of crude oil were spilled from the reef tanker), which happened in the 
sub-Arctic and had a range of negative effects on the local ecosystems. International Maritime 
Organization introduced comprehensive marine pollution prevention rules (MARPOL) through 
various conventions as a reaction on this event. 
There are few tankers operating in Svalbard area now, so this type of accident has a very low 
probability. It can increase significantly, however, in the case of sea ice reduction and more 
active usage of Arctic routes for transportation (Smith and Stephenson, 2013). That is why 
Norwegian government pays attention to the increasing of preparedness to oil spill and special 
plan has been developed for Svalbard (Sysselmannen på Svalbard, 2010). 
The most significant challenge posed by an arctic oil spill is dealing with oil in ice. Ice can 
make it more difficult to find a spill, reach it and deploy equipment and personnel to respond. 
However, ice can act as a natural barrier and prevent oil from spreading. Cooler temperatures 
and waves dampened by the ice can also slow the breakdown or “weathering” process of oil. 
This can increase the window of opportunity for recovery, dispersants and in-situ burning. 
There have been two large accidents with tourist ships in the Svalbard area (Maxim Gorkiy, 
1989 and Heanseatic, 1997 – see (Marchenko, 2015) for detail. Thanks to good weather 
conditions they both finished without any big injuries or human losses. They showed, however, 
the difficulties of rescue operation in such a remote area. 
Possible accidents with fishing boats are frequent in the Svalbard area. They produce the same 
problems/consequences of two mentioned above, but on a smaller scale. Fishing boats carry a 
much smaller amount of fuel and usually have 10-30 persons on the board. This type of accident 
has a relatively high probability of occurring, though. 
 
2) Mainland Norway  
Due to heavy traffic, the probability for accidents is high in the region of coastal Norway, even 
though measures by the coastal authority as vessel traffic zones and certificate demands reduce 
the probability of severe accidents. The cold climate in the winter increases the risk to life after 
an accident. Vessels operating all year have the highest risk. This includes the fishing fleet, but 
also large passenger ships operating for the larger part of the year.  
One of the most serious negative effects on the local ecosystems may be marine heavy oil spills. 
As an example, the cruise ship M/V Marco Polo grounded in the center of the Lofoten islands 
in November 2014 with 800m3 fuel oil on board. Luckily, no pollution occurred. If this had 
happened it may have had severe consequences in an area with a very sensitive nature and a 
large amount of tourist attractions. 
Oil and gas activity also represents some risk even though the number of accidents has been 
very few. Assessments of the risk of a worst case scenario, such as as a serious blow out in the 
Lofoten region during the most critical exploration period, shows that there is a risk of a serious 
blow out of Macondo size (lasts 50 days with a rate of 4500 cm3 per day) once in 750 years in 
the exploration phase. The consequence will have negative effects on the fish species with a 
recovery period of three years, one year for the beaches, 10 years for the sea birds. 
More oil companies and shipping companies are now involved in the Barents Sea, causing 
concern among environment groups. These companies are followed closely by the Petroleum 
Authority, with demands for increased safety and preparedness.  
More intensive shipping and increased industrial activity mean disposal of all kinds of waste. 
The approximate amount of oil sludge generated annually by ships operating in the Norwegian 
and Barents seas is 13,000 metric tons (Arctic Council, 2009). Risk vessels are defined by the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration as all tankers and vessels carrying hazardous and/or toxic 
cargo, and all vessels over 5,000 gross tons and all vessels containing radioactive materials.  
Statistically, there has been a strong increase in the number of navigational accidents since 
2005. There is a link between the distance sailed (extent of maritime traffic) and the number of 
 
 
accidents at sea that could entail danger to life, health, the environment and material assets 
(DSB, 2013). Accidents happening closer to the shore can be challenging for coastal transport.  
 
3) Russian part of Barents Sea  
All of the above mentioned consequences are relevant for the region and should be taken into 
consideration. The most dangerous and discussed events possible here are oil spills and 
accidents with ships. The probability of such events will grow with increasing activity levels. 
There have been no reported fixed oil spills or accidents involving nuclear icebreakers during 
the last years. 
Another specificity that should be mentioned is the limited transport infrastructure in many 
communities on the coast of the White and Barents Seas. Regular passenger transportation and 
freight are performed by ships. Hydro-meteorological messages are not always helpful due to 
large distance. The navigators are forced to rely on their experience and good skills. For 
example, the self-propelled pontoon “Varnek” sailed from Arkhangelsk on 21 July 2010 with 
17 cargo containers and other goods amounting to 130 tons total. She was lost in a storm on 23 
July. It was assumed that the captain looked for refuge from the storm to the North of Kanin 
Nos Peninsula. The ship owner tried to search for the “Varnek” himself, and only 61 hours after 
the disappearance of the “Varnek” he asked for help in the EMERCOM of Russia. In the second 
half of the same day, the rescue helicopter discovered the loss of a ship near the island of Korga. 
Nine people died (Khimanych, 2010).  
There are examples of unusual rescue operations. The rescue boat “Barents-1100” was caught 
in a severe storm on 8 June 2014 in the White Sea.  All emergency services were notified. 
Rescue helicopter “MI-8” and ships were dispatched to help, but it took time for them to reach 
the vessel in distress. The nuclear submarine “Voronezh” was closer to the place, came first and 
saved the crew and boat (Marine telegraph, 2014).   
The experience shows that we can avoid great disaster and unwanted consequences if we 
cooperate during rescue and preparedness improvements. Norway and Russia have a good 
tradition of mutual help. It is very important in border areas. A well-known example is the 
Russian dry cargo vessel Viktor Koryakin, which was pushed ashore by gale force winds while 
anchored by the coast of the Rybachiy Peninsula, Barents Sea on December 18, 2007. There 
were a crew of 12 and cargo of timber on board. The vessel had been anchored waiting for the 
weather to improve. Only three hours after the rescue central in Banak, Finnmark received a 
call that a Russian cargo vessel was in trouble outside the Rybachiy Peninsula, the crew on the 
Sea King helicopter had rescued all twelve sailors from the vessel. During the dramatic 
operation the vessel broke in two.  
 
ANALYSES OF RISK IN DIFFERENT SEA AREAS 
Risk estimation is based on an evaluation of the probability of an event and the possible 
consequences of the negative events. These are very difficult estimates, and are often based on 
statistics. Here we look into the statistics and different estimates present, and use this as a basis 
for qualitative risk assessments. Considering a risk as the amount of harm that can be expected 
to occur during a given time period due to a specific event, one can give indications on the level 
of risk. The risk is then the product of the probability that an accident happens multiplied by 
the severity of that harm. In practice, the risk level is usually given a coarse-grained 
categorization, because neither the probability nor the harm severity can be estimated with 
accuracy and precision. Some accident types such as violent action and terror have not yet 
happened, but may occur also in this region. Although this approach has been criticized (Cox 
Jr, 2008), it is widely used for risk assessment and gives adequate depiction and fruitful ideas 
for preparedness improvement. 
 
 
The perceptions of types of accidents and range of consequences are interpreted by the authors 
based on analytical reports and expert opinions. The following analyses in different sea areas 
used information presented in risk assessments by DNV GL (Paaske et al., 2014) (DNV GL, 
2014c, DNV GL, 2014a); the SADA report by Steipen et al. (Stepien et al., 2014); the AMSA 
report (Arctic Council, 2009); some provisions from the National Risk Analysis by DSB 
(Norwegian Directorate for civil Protection (DSB), 2013) and the incidents statistics 2013 of 
Norwegian Maritime Authority (www.sjofartsdir.no). For the Svalbard area, an overview of 
Longyearbyen port current and planned activities (Multiconsult, 2014) and risk analysis 
performed by Governor of Svalbard on 2013 (Sysselmannen på Svalbard, 2013) were used. 
General statistics, port reports and tendencies of development of navigation have been taken 
into consideration for the Russian Arctic. 
The use of expert opinions verifies the constructed assessments and fills up the gap of published 
analytical reports for the Russian region. Risk matrixes have been discussed at the MARPART 
project meeting in Murmansk on 10 April 2015 with different specialists: rescue and polity 
officers, lawyer and economists, geographers and navigators from Russia, Norway, Greenland 
and Island. Risk matrixes for investigated areas have been created as a result of the analysis of 
type of events and ship traffic features. We found the following types of events most adequate 
for consideration (Table 3). 
Table 3. Possible variation of accidents, depending of ship type and events 
 Tourist/Cruise 
ship 
Cargo/tanker/petroleum 
Rigs/floaters  
Fishing 
Grounding T-G C-G F-G 
Damage due to collision 
(sea ice and other) 
T-I C-I F-I 
Fire  T-F C-F F-F 
Violence/terror T-V C-V F-V 
Other reasons T-O C-O F-O 
Grounding means the ship hits land or underwater rock. Damage due to collision includes both 
collision with other vessels/sea installations and sea ice. The category fire is about fire breaking 
out on board. The category violence means incidents of violent behavior towards persons and 
physical installations. The category other may include construction failure. On risk matrix 
(Table 4-9): red area symbols high risk, yellow – modern, green – low. We distinguish risk for 
the environment (Table 4, 6, 8) and for people (passengers and crew) (Table 5, 7, 9). 
Table 4. Risk matrix of consequences for environment in Svalbard area 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  F-G    
3 - Occurs  F-I T-I,T-G,   
2 - Very Rare  F-O,F-F T-O,  C-O, C-I, 
T-F, C-F 
 
1 - Theoretically possible   F-V, C-V, T-V C-G,  
 insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
Table 5. Risk matrix of consequences for people (passengers, crew) in Svalbard area 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  F-G    
3 - Occurs  F-I  T-I,T-G  
2 -Very Rare  F-O C-O, C-I,T-O F-F T-F, C-F 
1 - Theoretically possible   C-G F-V,C-V T-V 
 insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
The tables above show that in the Svalbard region, the risk for environment is mostly middle 
and partly low. For people, the most dangerous events are fire on the major types of vessels and 
 
 
almost all accidents with tourist vessels. Low risk is for grounding with cargo and other 
accidents, including collisions with fishing vessels. 
Table 6. Risk matrix of consequences for environment in coastal Norway 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  F-G    
3 - Occurs  F-F  C-F C-G 
2 -Very Rare   T-F  T-G  
1 - Theoretically possible  F-V   T-V, C-V 
 insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
Table 7. Risk matrix of consequences for people in coastal Norway 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently    F-G  
3 - Occurs    C-G, C-F, F-F T-F 
2 - Very Rare     T-G 
1 - Theoretically possible    C-V, F-V T-V 
 insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
The tables above show that at the Norwegian mainland coastline, the frequency of grounding 
and fire among fishing vessels is quite high due to the number of vessels and the vessels 
operating in most years along a very challenging coast line. There is quite heavy cargo vessel 
traffic along the coastline, and the probability of grounding was earlier quite high, especially in 
winter. Better control of vessels’ technical quality, increased demands for coastal sailing 
certificates, pilot services and the vessel traffic control system (VTS) has reduced the frequency 
of grounding. For the environment, grounding of cargo vessels and cruise ship, even though 
they may occur only rarely, may have severe consequences, not at least because of the heavy 
fuel oil used and a vulnerable coast line with wildlife, fisheries, fish farming, tourist income 
and leisure activities. Oil spill recovery may also be severely hampered by bad weather, ice and 
snow, such as the Full City grounding in the Oslofjorden in 2009. The ship had 1100 tons of 
heavy fuel oil onboard. 200 tons leaked out and approximately 2500 sea birds lost their lives 
because of this accident. The oil spill recovery operation took almost one year. 
As for risk to life, fire on board ships is a serious threat, not at least on board cruise/tourist ships. 
The engine room explosion and the following fire on board the coastal steamer M/V Nordlys 
outside the town of Ålesund in 2011 resulted in two lives lost and 16 wounded. More lives 
among the 262 persons onboard could have been at stake if the fire had started in heavy weather 
and far from the nearest harbor. If a grounding occurs with a cruise ship along the Norwegian 
coast in winter, this may also have severe consequences. As for violent action and terror, the 
probability may be extremely low. However, the consequences both for lives and the 
environment may be disastrous. 
Table 8. Risk matrix of consequences for environment in Russian part of Barents Sea 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  T-I F-F   
3 - Occurs  F-G C-I T-F, T-G F-I 
2 – Very Rare  C-F, F-O T-O, T-V C-O  
1 – Theoretically 
possible 
  F-V C-G, C-V 
 Insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
 
 
Table 9. Risk matrix of consequences for people in Russian part of Barents Sea 
5 - Frequently      
4 - Relatively frequently  T-I C-I F-F  
3 - Occurs  F-G T-G,  T-F, F-I  
2 – Very Rare  C-F  F-O C-O,  T-V T-O 
1 – Theoretically possible   F-V C-G C-V 
 Insignificant minor moderate significant serious 
In general, the skill level of the Russian participants in maritime activity complies with 
international standards. At the same time, the human factor prevails as the main reason for 
accidents (Davydenko, 2015). In addition, there are technical risks that can occur. Most of the 
ships in this region have an age of more than 10 years. The fishing fleet is especially old and 
worn out (Shestakov, 2015) Terrorist attacks on infrastructure and vessels have never happened 
in the Russian Arctic, but the development of oil and gas activity may increase the risk. This is 
relevant in the context of open borders in the high latitudes of the Russian Arctic (Franz Josef 
Land).  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study we have illuminated the development of the activity level in the High North, 
discussed potential risk factors and made some qualitative risk assessments. We show that there 
are geographical differences in the High North that have to be assessed. Taking into 
consideration the lack of preparedness systems in sea areas such as the Svalbard region, the 
consequences are significant in most cases. There is a well-developed emergency system in 
coastal Norway close to the mainland. However, when there are incidents with larger ships such 
as cruise vessels or oil installations the whole system may be put to a test. In the Svalbard region 
and part of the Russian Atlantic region, the risk related to both grounding and collision with ice 
is rather high, but the number of ships is limited. When it comes to fire and terror there are 
severe challenges in all regions for life, especially for remote areas with severe weather 
conditions, even though the probability of such events are regarded as theoretically low. 
There is a need for more efforts as to capacities, technology development, improvement of 
routines and competence to reduce the probability of accidents. Also, governments should 
continue to discuss limitations of traffic in high risk areas. Within the new Polar code (adopted 
by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), in November 2014 (IMO, 2014) ) there should 
be special efforts from the governments in the North to implement special rules and regulations 
to avoid accidents, and to increase competence. Finally, there is a need for developing better 
search and rescue technology, oil spill response capacities in cold water areas, and not at least 
communication and transport infrastructure within the region for fast emergency response. 
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